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ASSIGNMENTS OF ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE AND THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY ACT
EUGENE J. T. FLANAGAN *
I. INTRODUCTION
Under our system of government there is no constitutional requirement
that the laws of the various states be uniform. On some points there are con-
siderable differences between the laws of sister states. Such is the case with
respect to the test for priority of right among successive assignees of an
account receivable. This difference becomes of great importance when a multi-
state transaction raises the question of the choice of the applicable law.
Fundamentally the problem is whether the jurisdiction in question fol-
lows the rule of Dearle v. Hall,' or the so-called American rule. 2 The former
establishes the order of precedence between competing assignees of a chose
in action according to the priority of the date of the notice to the account debt-
or. The latter establishes it according to the priority of the date of assign-
ment. The American rule is divided into the Massachusetts and New York
sub-rules, which respectively allow and do not allow certain equitable excep-
tions. Many jurisdictions are uncertain as to which rule or sub-rule they
adhere, and there is a marked tendency in this field for courts suddenly to
overthrow the established rule of their state. To add to this complexity, many
states in the last few years have passed either recording, book-marking or
validation statutes.3
Recently this disconcerting diversity has become of great significance
due to the hypothetical criterion for voidable preferences introduced by the
Chandler Act of 1938 4 in Section 60(a) .5
* B.S., 1946, Yale, LL.B, 1948, Harvard.
1. The rule was laid down in two simultaneously decided cases: Dearle v. Hall, 3 Russ.
1, 48, 38 Eng. Rep. 475, 494 (Ch. 1828) ; Loveridge v. Cooper, 3 Russ. 1, 30, 38 Eng.
Rep. 475, 486 (Ch. 1828). On the whole problem of successive assignments, see 2 WILLIS-
TON, CONTRACTS § 435 (Rev. ed. 1936).
2. The leading case is Salem Trust Co. v. Manufacturers' Finance Co., 264 U. S. 182,
44 Sup. Ct. 266, 68 L. Ed. 628 (1924).
3. See Koessler, Assignment of Accounts Receivable, 33 CALIF. L. Rlv. 40 (1945);
and Koessler, New Legislation Affecting Non-Notification Financing of Accounts Receiv-
able, 44 MICH. L. REv. 563 (1946).
4. "One of the most notable results of the Chandler Act has been the confusion it
has introduced into the practice of law of the assignment of accounts receivable." Hanna,
Some Unsolved Problems Under Section 60A of the Bankruptcy Act, 43 COL. L. Rv. 58,
69 (1943).
5. That section defines a preference as, "a transfer ... of any of the property of a
debtor to or for the benefit of a creditor for or on account of an antecedent debt, made or
suffered by such debtor while insolvent and within four months before the filing by or
against him of a petition in bankruptcy . . .the effect of which will be to enable such
creditor to obtain a greater percentage of his debt than some other creditor of the same
class ... a transfer shall be deemed to have been made at the time when it became so
409
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Prior to the Chandler Act an assignment of an account receivable was
good against the trustee in bankruptcy if the assignee had enough dominion
over the' account to create a genuine security interest in it. The Supreme
Court in the now famous Klauder case 6 held that the Chandler Act changed
all this. In that case, the Corn Exchange Bank made a loan to the Quaker
City Sheet Metal Company, later the Jbankrupt, and received as security
certain contemporaneously written assignments of the company's accounts
receivable. The bank did not notify the account debtors of the assignments
as then required by the local Pennsylvania law, which followed Dearle v.
Hall. Accordingly title to the accounts was not perfected because in theory a
later bona fide assignee who gave notice could prevail over the bank.
In a suit between the bank and the trustee in bankruptcy, the Supreme
Court held (1) that matters of title-perfection must be determined by bank-
ruptcy courts under applicable state law; (2) that under Pennsylvania law,
the bank's title was not perfected; and (3) thus the assignments must be
deemed to have been perfected immediately before bankruptcy and accord-
ingly the assignments were preferences, which could be avoided by the
trustee in bankruptcy.
7
This decision, causing a stir in commercial circles, has resulted in a
mass of articles in legal and banking periodicals.8 One interesting phase of
this problem, however, has been discussed only slightly. If the perfection
of title must be determined under applicable state law, what is the applicable
law in a multi-state accounts receivable transaction?
At the present time there is no accepted solution to this interesting
choice-of-law problem: Dr. Maximillian Koessler has testified that, "there
is not a single writer of the conflict of law aspect of this problem who asserts
that there is any certain rule as to this matter." 9 The few courts which to
far perfected that no bona-fide purchaser from the debtor and no creditor could thereafter
have acquired any rights in the property so transferred superior to the rights of the trais-
feree therein.. ." 52 STAT. 869 (1938), 11 U. S. C. A. § 96(a) (1943). The Act specifically
provides that the "transfer" includes an assignment. 52 STAT. 842 (1938), 11 U. S. C. A.
§ 1(30) (Supp. 1947).
6. Corn Exchange National Bank & Trust Company v. Klauder, 318 U. S. 434, 63
Sup. Ct. 679, 87 L. Ed. 884 (1943).
7. See discussion in Montgomery, Review of Supreme Court Ruling on Assigunment
of Accounts Receivable, 17 J. N. A. REF. BANKR. 119 (1943).
8. See biographical list in Koessler, Assignment of Accounts Receivable, 33 CALIF.
L. REv. 40, 51 n. 36 (1945) ; Koessler, New Legislation Affecting Non-Notification
Financing of Accounts Receivable, 44 MicH. L. REv. 563 n. 1 (1946). Also see Kupfer
and Livingston, Corn Exchange Bank & Trust Co. v. Klauder Revisited: The AftLermath
of Its Implications, 32 VA. L. REv. 910 (1946), and Corn Exchange Bank & Trust Co.
v. Klauder Revisited: A Supplemental Note, 33 VA. L. REv. 1 (1947) ; and see the sym-
posium on Secured Commercial Financing in 13 LAW & CONT P. PROBL. 555-702 (1948).
'9. Stenographic Report of Hearing on Assignments of Accounts Receivable held
at the House of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, September 21, 1945,
which is Appendix V of the New York Law Revision Commission's Communication and
Study Relating to Assignment of Accounts Receivable 251, 261 (1946), reprinted in Nnw
YORx LAw-REvIsION CoMMIssION, REPORT 351, 611 (1946). Also see Report of the Com-
ittee on Uniform State Laws of the Association of the City of New York (1944) and
Malcolm, Supplemental Opinion on Conflict of Laws, 30 MAss. L. Q. 38, 40 (Oct., 1945).
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date have been faced with the problem have failed to analyze the grounds
for their decisions to any satisfactory extent. It is the purpose of this article
to evaluate whatever concepts have been developed by the courts and legal
scholars and to explore their potential applicability. But before entering on
theoretical grounds it is advisable to outline briefly some of the practical
aspects of accounts receivable financing.
II. ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE FINANCING
This type of financing has been defined as, "a continuing arrangement
whereby funds are made available to a business concern by a financing
agency that purchases the concern's invoices or accounts receivable over
a period of time or makes that concern advances or loans, taking one or a
series of assignments of the accounts as primary collateral security." 10 It
can be broken down into two major classifications: factoring and non-
notification financing.
Factoring consists in the purchase generally by factoring companies of
a concern's accounts receivable without recourse on the vendor for any
credit loss and with immediate notice to the trade customers that payments
are to be made to the factor. Therefore, in factoring there is neither the
problem of successive assignees nor of Section 60(a) of the Chandler Act."
So factoring poses no choice-of-law problem.
Non-notification financing, conducted mainly by commercial banks and
finance companies, involves the purchase of accounts receivable or their
assignment as collateral for loans. It differs from factoring in that the trade
customers are not notified of the transaction, and also in that there is no
assumption of the credit risk of bad accounts.
Although non-notification financing has been used by an increasing
number of business concerns in recent years and its total volume is several
billion dollars annually,12 the financial position of firms who employ this
type of financing has been subject to some debate. Saulnier and Jacoby,
however, in a statistical study, Accounts Receivable Financing, concluded
that most clients of non-notification financing companies are relatively small
concerns which are in shaky financial situations.
In addition, the Saulnier and Jacoby survey significantly revealed that
in non-notification financing 47% of the individual accounts receivable
assigned or sold were for less than $250,' 3 and that on the average a financing
10. SAULNIER AND JACOBY, ACCOUNTs RECEIVABLE FINANCING 17 (1943).
11. But see Koessler, Assignment of Accounts Receivable, 33 CALIF. L. REV. 40,
55, and references cited in note 44.
12. For figures see SAULNIER AND JACOBY, op. cit. supra note 10.
13. Id. at 78.
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agency is obliged-to handle 1,000 or more separate accounts per year for a
concern whose average account is $250.14
Non-notification is the direct and necessary consequence of the financial
instability of the borrower and of the small size of the accounts. To notify
1,000 or more account debtors would be a difficult and expensive task.
Borrowers generally wish to keep secret the fact that they are borrowing on
their accounts as they feel that it reflects on their financial integrity, and
does not precisely conduce to customer confidence.' 5 Thus the borrower and
the lender have a mutual desire in not making known the transaction. Some
authorities have accepted non-notification as a satisfactory practice ;16 others
have condemned it for creating secret liens.'
7
Under normal operation, the account debtor will pay his bill to the
borrower, generally at the latter's place of business. The borrower will either
turn this money over to the financing concern in payment of his loan or
assign new book accounts as further security. In practice there is a rapid
collection of the assigned accounts, and new accounts are continually substi-
tuted as security for the loan. Usually this operation is conducted under a
continuing contract with the financing agency.
III. LAW SELECTING THE CHOICE-OF-LAw RULE
Although Congress has the constitutional power to settle all bankruptcy
cases by a uniform federal law,1 8 Congress has not gone to the full extent of
its power in the present act. It is necessary in the determination of voidable
preferences, therefore, for the federal bankruptcy courts to refer to the
applicable state law.19
In the determination of the preference, there are two conflict-of-laws
problems. The ultimate and vital one is the choice of the applicable law. The
14. Id. at 79.
15. Id. at 20 et seq.; DUNCAN, THE RECEIVABLES BUSINESS (1923).
16. "Pledges of book accounts do not generally notify the debtor unless there are
grounds for doubting the assignor's honesty or solvency; otherwise the good will of
the assignor would be injured, and the difficulties of collection would be increased."
Hamilton, The Effect of Section Sixty of the Bankruptcy Act upon Assignment of
Accounts Receivable, 26 VA. L. REV. 168 (1939). "Most talk of secret liens seems to
belong to a dream world." Hanna, supra note 4 at 69.
17. See Corn Exchange National Bank & Trust Co. v. Klauder, 318 U. S. 434,
63 Sup. Ct. 679, 87 L. Ed. 884 (1943).
18. "The Congress shall have Power . . . To establish . . . uniform Laws on
the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States." U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 8.
19. This proposition was questioned in Note, 27 VA. L. REV. 950, 951 (1941),
"since the issue of preference or no-preference is governed by the Bankrupey Act."
All the cases, however, apply the applicable state law. Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U. S. 353,
45 Sup. Ct. 566, 69 L. Ed. 991 (1925); Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309
U. S. 478, 60 Sup. Ct. 628, 84 L. Ed. 876 (1940); Corn Exchange National Bank &
Trust Co. v. Klauder, 318 U. S. 434, 63 Sup. Ct. 679, 87 L. Ed. 884 (1942). See 3
COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY § 60.48 (14th ed. 1941); 2 GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES
AND PREFERENCES, § 583 (Rev. ed. 1940); New York State La v Revision Commission,
supra note 9 at 86.
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preliminary problem is the determination of the law which will decide that
choice. On both subjects there is little case law.
It is clear, since Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Co., Inc., 20 that federal
courts must abide by state rules of conflict of laws at least where the juris-
diction of the federal court is based on diversity of citizenship. It is an open
question if the Klaxon rule would be followed in a bankruptcy case, where
federal jurisdiction is not based on diversity. The lower federal courts have
produced divergent holdings.
2 1
Although the Supreme Court did not find it necessary to decide the
question in D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. F. D. 1. C.,22 Mr. Justice Jackson,
in a concurring opinion,23 argued that the problem should be solved on the
basis of federal law. Similarly Judge Goodrich of the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals while finding that a solution was not called for In re Rosen
thought that federal law would be applicable, "since we are engaged in the
general problem of applying a federal statute. '2 4 Again the question was
presented to the Supreme Court in Vanston Bondholders Protective Com-
mittee v. Green,25 but the majority opinion decided the case on a theory
which did not require a holding on the conflicts question. 26 The concurring
opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, however, by discussing the choice of
law on its merits without reference to that of the forum state seemingly
assumed a federal rule. The majority opinion of the court does not appear
to disagree with this result.
2 7
It is submitted that the better result is that the choice of the applicable
state law be decided according to federal conflict-of-laws rules.28 The ratio
decidendi of the Klaxon case is to secure uniformity with state decisions,
bechuse "otherwise, the accident of diversity of citizenship would consistently
disturb equal administration of justice in co-ordinate state and federal courts
sitting side by side."'2 9 It is obvious that this reason does not apply in a
bankruptcy case. One of the principal objectives of the Bankruptcy Act is
to secure as great uniformity of application throughout the United States as
20. 313 U. S. 487, 61 Sup. Ct. 1020, 85 L. Ed. 1477 (1940).
21. Compare United Construction Co. v. Milam, 124 F. 2d 670 (C. C. A. 6th 1942),
cert. denied, 317 U. S. 642 (1942) (state rule), with Winkle v. Scott, 99 F. 2d 299
(C. C. A. 8th 1938), cert. denied, 306 U. S. 634 (1939) (federal rule implied).
22. 315 U. S. 447, 62 Sup. Ct. 676, 86 L. Ed. 956 (1942).
23. Id. at 465.
24. 157 F. 2d 997, 999 (C. C. A. 3d 1946).
25. 329 U. S. 156, 67 Sup. Ct. 237, 91 L. Ed. 162 (1946).
26. See criticism in 60 -ARv. L. REv. 639, 640 (1947): "A more logical analysis
of the case would require a prior determination as to the validity of the claim..
27. See 60 -ARv. L. RZv. 641 (1947).
28. See Lowenstein, Assignment of Accounts Receivable and the Bankruptcy Act,
1 RuTGERS UNrV. L. REv. 1, 27 (1947), and Notes, 59 HARv. L. REv. 966 (1946) and
60 -ARV. L. REv. 639 (1947). But cf. Notes, 41 COL. L. REv. 1403, 1405 n. 11 (1.941)
and 44 COL. L. R~v. 925, 928 n. 16 (1944).
29. Klaxon Co. v., Stentor Electric Co., Inc., 313 U. S. 487, 496, 61 Sup. Ct.
1020, 85 L. Ed. 1477 (1940).
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is possible. Accordingly there is strong logic supporting the contention that
the courts should apply federal law to determine the controlling state law.
IV. THE CHOICE-OF-LAW RULE
(1) Federal Cases
Assuming that federal law is to govern the choice of law, what is the
status of that law?
The only accounts receivable cases to appear before the Supreme Court
have been the Klauder case, 30 and McKenzie v. Irving Trust Co.31
As we have seen, all the events of the Klauder case transpired in Penn-
sylvania, and it was obvious that the law of that state must govern. Mr.
Justice Jackson did remark, however, that:
"So also is it true that conflicts and confusion may result where the transaction or
location of the parties is of such a nature that doubt arises as to which of different state
laws is applicable." "
In the McKenzie case, the Supreme Court held that general federal law
rather than the applicable state law governed because the assigned contract
was made by the United States Government. Accordingly there was no
conflicts question to consider.
We may conclude therefore that there is no authoritative Supreme
Court precedent to settle this difficult problem.
The most recent lower federal case is In re Rosen, 33 which arose in the
third circuit. In this case the assignor did business in New Jersey with New
Jersey customers. The assignor entered a written contract with the Standard
Factors Corporation, the assignee. This contract, which stated the terms by
which credit was to be extended, contaihed the clause, "all transactions.
assignments and transfers hereunder, and all rights of the parties, shall be
governed as to validity, construction, enforcement, and in all other respects
by the laws of the state of Pennsylvania." 34 The accounts were payable at
the assignor's place of business in New Jersey, and their proceeds were
30. Corn Exchange National Bank & Trust Co. v. Klauder, 318 U. S. 434, 63
Sup. Ct. 679, 87 L. Ed. 884 (1943).
31. 323 U. S. 365, 65 Sup. Ct. 405, 89 L. Ed. 305 (1945).
32. 318 U. S. at 441.
33. 157 F. 2d 997 (C. C. A. 3d 1946), cert. denied, 330 U. S. 835 (1946). There
have been three relevant decisions in the district courts; but, unfortunately, the question
here discussed was either moot or not discussed in those opinions. In re Talbot Canning
Corp., 35 F. Supp. 680 (D. Md. 1940) ; In re Seim Construction Company, 37 F. Supp.
855 (D. Md. 1941); In re Vardaman Shoe Co., 52 F. Supp. 562 (E. D. Mo. 1943).
34. 157 F. 2d at 999. A provision such as quoted here is ineffective in a bankruptcy
proceeding. It is binding only upon the immediate parties to the contract. In re Leterman,
Besher & Company, Inc., 260 Fed. 543 (C. C. A. 2d 1919), cert. denied, 250 U. S. 668
(1919). And for bankruptcy purposes the assignor's trustee in bankruptcy is a third
parts'. See ItL re Vardaman Shoe Co., 52 F. Supp. 562, 565 (E. D. Mo. 1943). Further-




deposited in a New Jersey bank. Forty-four assignments were made under
the contract. The question of their validity arose when the assignor became
a bankrupt within four months after the assignee gave notice to the account
debtors.
When the case came before Referee in Bankruptcy Schenck, he applied
New Jersey law, because:
".... the accounts that were assigned grew out of dealings between the bankrupts
and their customers, all New Jersey parties. The contracts between these parties were
made in New Jersey and were to be performed in New Jersey. It is the law of the place
of performance of the assigned contract or account that determines which of successive
assignees is entitled to the account." "
When the Rosen case appeared before the District Court little was said
about the conflicts problem. Judge Fake wrote:
"It is, of course, obvious here or elsewhere that 'one cannot have his cake and eat
it too' so if the assignments were perfected and valid when and where made, they remain
valid against the trustee, and he takes nothing which the bankrupt had theretofore,
validly disposed of." "
The opinion in the Circuit Court was written by Judge* Goodrich, an
acknowledged authority in the field of conflict of laws. Judge Goodrich held:
"What is here involved is the effect of the actual assignment. This took place in
New Jersey and by the usual conflict of laws rule, is determined by New Jersey law." "
At least one reason why Judge Goodrich took this position is that there
was never any real question of any law other than New Jersey's applying.
His complete explanation for the holding was as follows:
"The District Court discussed the cases and reached its conclusion on the basis
of New Jersey law. In presenting the case to this court the parties have made most of
their argument on the New Jersey authorities. We are deciding the case on New Jersey
law also, the reason being that on the conflict of laws question we think this is the
proper reference." 38
We can only guess whether or not the court would have employed the
same reasoning if the assignments had been made in a state which had no
other contact with the case and if the issue had been contested earnestly.
35. Decision of Referee in Bankruptcy Schenck of the Federal District Court of
New Jersey, in it re Adam Hebeler & Co., (Feb. 8, 1945), quoted in part in In re
Rosen, 66 F. Supp. 174, 176 (D. N. J. 1946). Shortly afterwards Referee Schenck
was called on to decide a similar case, and although there the place of the assigments
and the place of performance of the assigned contracts, the assignor's place of business,
were in different states, it is noteworthy that in the conflict of laws part of the decision
the Referee employed language almost identical with that of his previous decision.
Unpublished opinion of Referee in Bankruptcy Schenck of the Federal District Court
of New Jersey in In re Nizolek Furniture & Carpet Co., (Aug. 21, 1945).
36. 66 F. Supp. 174, 178 (D. N. J. 1946) (italics added).




If there can be said to be any definite federal rule, it must be that of
the Rosen case-the law of the place of a~signment governs. But Judge
Goodrich's reasoning in that case is subject to criticism. He treated the
problem as the question of "the effect of the actual assignment." 39 That,
however, is not the problem! Section 60(a) of the Bankruptcy Act adopts,
as the conclusive test, the rights of a bona fide purchaser. The Act states
that "a transfer shall be deemed to have been made at the time when it be-
came so far perfected that no bona fide purchaser from the debtor and no
creditor could thereafter have acquired any rights in the property so trans-
ferred superior to the rights of the transferee therein . .. ." 4 The trustee
in bankruptcy is not made a bona fide purchaser but his rights are measured
by those of a bona fide purchaser.4 1 To determine whether or not an assign-
ment of an account receivable is a preference the iypothetical test of the
effect of a subsequent bona fide assignment must be employed. Thus, the
problem is not what law governs the effect of the actual assignment, but what
law governs the priority of assignments, and Judge Goodrich failed to con-
sider that question.
(2) Other Authorities
A leading handbook on bankruptcy in a section headed "Assignments;
Perfection of Assignments of Accounts Receivable" 42 supports the place of
performance as the decisive ltw. It is said there:
*"What state law governs? It appears that where there is an assignment of a con-
tract right such as an account receivable, the law of the place of performance of the
contract will govern as to whether notice to the debtor is required. See Restatement,
Conflict of Laws §§ 353, 354; 2 Beale, Conflict of Laws (1935) § 354.1; Annotation,
31 A. L. R. 876, 883; Annotation, 110 A. L. R. 774, 778. This seems logical and affords
a workable theory .... See Warren v. Copelin, 4 Met. (Mass.) 594. There is however,
much confusion on the problem, as witness the authorities cited supra." "'
The authorities cited give little support for the proposition presented,
and the exact ground for the holding of Warren v. Copelin 4 4 is very doubt-
39. Ibid.
40. 52 STAT. 869 (1938), 11 U. S. C. A. § 96(a) (1943).
41. 2 GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES §§ 486-89 (Rev. ed. 1940).
42. 3 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY § 60.48 (14th ed. 1941).
43. Id. at 963 n. 11.
44. 45 Mass. 594 (1942). A Connecticut resident was sued on a non-negotiable
promissory note by the plaintiff, a bona fide assignee. The note was made in Connecticut;
the assignment, in Massachusetts. Without knowing of the assignment, the defendant
had submitted to a default judgment to a garnisher of the payee. By Massachusetts law,
the assignment alone would give the indorsee a title preferable to that of an attaching
creditor, but by the Connecticut law notice was necessary. The court, in non-suiting the
plaintiff reasoned: "The note was made in Connecticut, both parties were at the time
inhabitants of that state, and the contract was to be performed there." 45 Mass. at 597.
It would seem, therefore, because of the multitude of reasons given for Connecticut law
governing, i.e., place of making of the original contract, domicile of the parties, and




ful. There can be little argument with the last sentence of the above quotation.
Stumberg in his Principles of Conflict of Laws thought "that this ques-
tion should depend upon the law of the place where performance is to be
made by the original obligor," although "there is room for difference of
opinion." 45
The Proposed Final Draft No. 2 of the Restatement of Conflict of Laws
took this same position on the -basic question of successive assignees. The
relevant section read:
"Section 383-B. SUCCESSIVE ASSIGNMENTS.
."The law of the place of performance of an assigned contract determines which of
two or more successive assignments shall have priority." "
Professor Beale, the Reporter for the Restatement, in his official Coln-
inentaries to this draft 47 cited as authorities sustaining that position Van-
buskirk v. Hartford Fire Insurance "Company,48 Lewis v. Lawrence,49 and
Hanna v. Lichtenheim.50
These citations are quite surprising. In the Vanbuskirk and the Lewis
cases the second "assignees" are garni~hers and not real assignees. Thus
their position as authorities is doubtful. Furthermore, in the Vanbuskirk
case and in Hanna v. Lichtenheimt no question was raised as to where the
45. STUIXBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 236 (1937). Stumberg argues: "When there have
been successive voluntary assignments, the question becomes one of determining whether
the policy at the place of assignment, or that of the place of performance, or of some
other place is to control. Since the policy is one which is designed to fix the circum-
stances under which performance is due to an assignee, it would seem that the assignee
who comes within the requirement of the place of performance should be entitled to
performance." Id. at 236 n. 16.
46. RESTATE-M1\ENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (Proposed Final Draft No. 2, 1931).
47. RESTATEmENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (Commentaries No. 2, 1928).
48. 14 Conn. 582 (1842). A assigned his claim against a Connecticut insurance
company to B in New York. The assignment was perfected under New York law
without notice. C, a creditor of A, attached the claim in Connecticut. Although A, B
and C were all residents of New York, C contended that the Connecticut law of the
forum should be applied. The court held that New York law governed, but explained
that was only because all the parties were residents of that state.
49. 30 Minn. 244, 15 N. W. 113 (1883). An Illinois creditor made an assignment
in that state to a Louisiana resident of a debt due from a resident of Minnesota, and
payable there. Minnesota followed the American rule, and Illinois, the English rule.
Before the assignee gave notice to the debtor, a Canadian creditor of the debtor
garnished the debt. The Minnesota court held that its law and not that of Illinois
controlled. The court seemed to be applying Minnesota law because it was the law of
the forum, although it did mention that the debtor resided and the debt was payable there,
and that Minnesota "must be deemed the situs of this debt." 30 Minn. at 247, 15 N. W.
at 114.
50. 182 App. Div. 94, 169 N. Y. Supp. 589 (1st Dep't 1918), rev'd, 225 N. Y. 579,
122 N. E. 625 (1919). This is the leading case on the subject. The complete reasoning
of the New York court in settling the conflicts problem of successive assignees was:
"The assignments were made in New Jersey, which was also the state of the domicile
of the creditor. Therefore the law of New Jersey, it being the place of the contract and
the situs of the thing, would govern." 169 N. Y. Supp. at 591. Clearly the governing
law in this case was that of New Jersey, but it is difficult to say on what particular
consideration the court founded its decision. Also, it should be noted, as one annotator
has pointed out, that the law of New Jersey was the same as that of the forum, New
York. Note, 31 A. L. R. 876, 883 (1924).
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contract was made or to be performed.5' The later Connecticut case of Clark
v. Connecticut Peat Company 52 would seem to indicate that Vanbbuskirk v.
Hartford Fire Insurance Company stood for the law of the place of contract-
ing, and the language quoted from Hanna v. Lichtenheinm seems to place that
case in the same category. The rationale of Lewis v. Lawrence is, at best,
ambiguous.
When the Restatement was published in its final form, the wording of this
section was changed to the following:
"Section 354. SUCCESSIVE ASSIGNMENTS.
"The law of the place of performance of an assigned contract determines whether
payment by the obligor to a second assignee destroys the right to performance of the
first assignee." "
Referee Schenck in his decisions in the Rosen case and in In re Nizolek
Furniture & Carpet Co.,54 and the Supreme Court of New York in Wishnick
v. Preserves & Honey, Inc., 55 relied heavily on this section in basing their
decision on the law of the place of performance of the assigned contract.
Koessler, however, has demonstrated convincingly that this section does not
give a solution to the problem of priority of successive assignees. He argues
that rather than settle the question of priority of successive assignees the
Restatement only determines whether payment to a junior assignee destroys
the right of the senior assignee as against the debtor of the assigned accounts.
This argument is supported by the official illustration, historical construction
of the wording of section 354 and the fact that a contrary interpretation
would be inconsistent with the view of Professor Beale, the spiritual father
of the Restatement.56
51. See 2 BEALE, CONFLICT or LAWS 1258 (1935).
52. 35 Conn. 303 (1868). A Connecticut creditor of Massachusetts residents had
attached debts due them from Connecticut residents. Prior to the attachment, the debts
had been assigned to other Massachusetts residents without notice to the debtors. By
the Massachusetts law, the assignments were good without notice. The court held that
the assignments were valid although notice was required by Connecticut law. The court
stated that it was following Vanbuskirk v. Hartford Fire Insurance Company, and that
it was irrelevant that the attaching creditor was a resident of Connecticut. The court
explained that, "the cases rest upon the principle that the law of the place where the
contracts were made must control as to their validity everywhere." Id. at 308.
53. RESTATE-MENT, CO.,FLIcT oF LAWs (1934).
54. See note 35 supra.
55. 153 Misc. 596, 275 N. Y. Supp. 420 (Sup. Ct. 1934), modified as to anount
of recovery, 247 App. Div. 738, 285 N. Y. Supp. 522 (2d Dep't 1936), but restored,
272 N. Y. 252, 5 N. E. 2d 808 (1936). A Missouri resident made successive assignments
in Missouri of a life insurance policy issued by a Missouri company. When the Missourian
died, a controversy arose as to who received the proceeds of the policy. The court applied
Missouri law because it felt that the controlling factors were "that the contract was
between residents of the state of Missouri, to be performed there and assigned there."
275 N. Y. Supp. at 422. The case is generally cited as authority for the place of per-
formance of the assigned contract, because the court relied on Section 383-B of the
Proposed Final Draft No. 2 of the Restatement, but it should be noted that Missouri
was also the place of the assignments.
56. Koessler, New Legislation Affecting Non-Motification Financing of Accounts
Receivable, 44 MIcE. L. REv. 563, 611, 612 (1946).
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Professor Beale devoted a section of his treatise to the subject of priority
among successive assignees. 57 After discussing Hanna v. Lichtenheim and In
re Queensland Mercantile and Agency Co.5s ("the case seems indefensible in
theory . . ."), he stated his opinion that where both assignments are made
in one state or in different states with similar law, that law should control.
"There is no reason why any other law .. . should have anything to do
with it." 59 That may be true in a suit between assignees but we may question
the reasonableness of its application to the test under the Bankruptcy Act.
Next Professor Beale stated his opinion that in cases where the laws
of the states differ the law of the state of the first assignment must govern.
This theory applied to section 60(a) would make the law of the state 6f
the actual assignment test its validity as against a hypothetica bona fide
assignee. Perhaps this is what Judge Goodrich had in mind in In re Rosen.
Beale's solution of the problem when the assignments are made in
different states is more theoretical and slightly more complicated than the
single-state transaction. Professor Beale belonged to the so-called vested-
rights school, and he accordingly believed that the essential validity of a
contract-any contract-was tested by the law of the place of contracting.
A corollary to that proposition was that the essential validity of an assign-
ment was governed by the law of the place of assignment.60 Since therefore
in a case of successive assignments, the law of the state of the first assign-
ment would create a right which could not be altered by any other state,
its law governed the priority of assignees. Beale declared:
"If by the law of the place where the first assignment was made, notice to the debtor
is unnecessary, and by the law of the place of the second assignment notice is required,
the first assignee should prevail whether he first gave notice or not, since he acquired
a legal or equitable right which the law of the place of the second assignment cannot
deprive him of, in the absence of collection by the second assignee or the like. If by the
57. 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAws § 354.1 (1935).
58. [1891] 1 Ch. 536, aff'd, [1892] 1 Ch. 219 (C. A.). This English case seemingly
applied the law of -the debtor's domicile. When an Australian company called the
remainder of its unpaid capital, suit was brought in Scotland to arrest the calls on
shares held there. The holders of the Scottish shares had no notice of a prior claim on
the unpaid capital. Under the Scottish law, the arrestment was equivalent to an assign-
ment with notice. In the English winding-up of the company, the Chancery Division
held that the question of priority on the proceeds of the Scottish-held shares was
regulated by the laws of Scotland.
59. 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS 1258 (1935).
60. Id. at § 352.1. Accord: GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 110 (2d ed. 1938);
MINOR, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 (1901); WHARTON, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 353b (3d
ed. 1905). Contra: DICEY, CONFLICT OF LAWS, Rule 153' (5th ed. 1932) (law of
debtor's domicile controlling) ; STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 362 (8th ed. 1883), § 37-
(creditor's domicile); WESTLAKE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW § 150 (7th ed. 1917)
(debtor's domicile). There is strong authority for making the essential validity and
effect of the assignment depend upon the law that governs the assigned contract.
CHESHIRE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 444, 454 (2d ed. 1937); FOOTE, PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW 296 (5th ed. 1925) ; LEWALD, DEUTCHES INTERN ATIONALES PRIVAT-
RECHT 270 (1931); SCHNITZER, INTERNATIONALES HANDELSRECHT 218 (1938) ; WOLFF,




law of the place of the first assignment notice is required, the first assignee acquired a
right which is incomplete and ineffective as against subsequent assignees even by the
law of the place where it arises until that notice is given; consequently a second assign-
ment made in a place which requires no notice to the debtor should be given priority." 1
The desirability of the fundamental basis of Beale's theory, that the
validity of a contract is determined by the law of the place of contracting,
has been discussed at length,62 and no detailed discussion is warranted here.
Beale believed that the conflict of laws dealt "primarily with the application
of laws in space." 63 Accordingly, "general principles" are postulated and rules
derived without more than incidental consideration for their social, economic
or business expediency.6 4 This purely conceptualistic approach to the subject
of conflict of laws seems to be out of place in our modern system of juris-
prudence.6 5 When the abstract theory, based solely on a priori deductions,
is applied to a practical problem such as the assignment of accounts receivable,
it does not necessarily produce those economic and socially desirable results
which are the goal of a legal system.
66
In practice the application of the law of the place of assignment is not
highly desirable. That may well be the law of some state which has no
other contact with the assignment than the accidental making of the assign-
ment there.67 The law which determines the validity of an assignment will
dictate whether or not recording is necessary and where it must be done.68
61. 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS 1258-59 (1935).
62. Accord: Beale, What Law Governs the Validity of a Contract, 23 HARv. L.
REv. 1 (1909); GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS 229-31 (2d ed. 1938). Contra: Cavers,
A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARv. L. REV. 173 (1933) ; Cook, 'Con-
tracts' and the Conflict of Laws, 31 ILL. L. REV. 143 (1936) ; Heilman, Judicial Method
and Economic Objectives in Conflict of Laws, 43 YALE L. J. 1082 (1934); Lorenzen,
Validity and Effects of Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, 30 YALE L. J. 565 (1921);
Lorenzen and Heilman, 7 he Restatement of the Conflict of Laws, 83 U. OF PA. L. REV.
555 (1935). Also see, McClintock, Beale on the Conflict of Laws, 84 U. OF PA. L. REV.
309 (1936).
63. 1 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAws 1 (1935).
64. See Beale, Summary of the Conflict of Laws, § 90, first printed as an appendix
in 3 BEALE, CASES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws (1902) and reprinted in his SELECTION s
FROMf A TREATISE ON ThE CONFLICT OF LAWS 1, 42 (1935).
65. See Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L. J.
457 (1924) ; Cavers, supra note 62, at 178; Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy and
the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L. J. 736 (1924).
66. "These imperfections [in the subject of Conflict of Laws] do not result solely
from.the special character and complexity of the questions which Private International
Law has for its object to resolve, but also from the defective method which has been
used in its elaboration. The authors which have formulated its rules have almost always
attempted to deduce them from a very general and very abstract notion: territorial
sovereignty, personal sovereignty, community of law between states, international
courtesy, or, what amounts to the same thing, mutual respect of one sovereign for
another, maintenance of rights vested under the law of foreign state, etc. The a priori
principle, from which these authors have pretended to derive their theory, has always
proved powerless to furnish or to justify a practical rule; on the contrary it has only
too often misled such author in his search for a solution." Arminjan, Le Domaine dn
Droit International Priv , 49 CLUNET 905 (1922).
67. "To test an assignment by the place where it was made is to choose the least
important of all points of contact, to substitute fortuity for reason." WOLFF, PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW 552 (1945).
68. See Note, 20 HARv. L. REv. 637 (1907).
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If the law of the place of assignment should control, avoidance of the local
recording or book-marking statute could be achieved by" the simple device
of completing the assignpent in a state which has a validation statute.69 It is
objectionable that the local law can be avoided so easily without any change in
the substance of the transaction merely because of a conflict-of-laws rule, and
especially when that rule is based on a conceptualistic approach to the subject
without regard to business expedience.
These defects indicate the undesirability of applying a general rule to all
types of contracts. Each contract should be examined in its setting. Un-
fortunately, many modern decisions hold that the validity of an assignment
is determined by the laws of the state where the assignment is made without
any discussion of the matter other than a citing of the Restatement or Beale's
treatise. These courts fail to consider the particular contract in question and
the interests presented in the case, and the approach of the court in Union
Trust Co. v. Bulkeley 70 is more to be admired. There the court resolved the
problem in the following manner:
"Finally, it is contended that the assignment was a Connecticut contract, and that
by the law of that state a pledge or mortgage of after acquired property does not attach
until the mortgagee takes possession thereof. But we think the law of Michigan was the
law which governed the transaction. It is true the contract was made in Connecticut, but
it concerned a subject-matter located in Michigan, namely, book accounts and bills
receivable-the products of a business to be carried on at Detroit. The indorsed paper
would probably be used there, and the possession of the accounts and bills remained with
the assignor at that place, where also the possession to be taken by the assignee in the
contingency stated would be likely to occur. We think the parties intended their contract
should be carried out in Michigan, where the bankrupt and his business were located. We
do not, therefore, stop to inquire what effect the law prevailing in Connecticut would
have upon the transaction if it were applicable." 1
The view of the Restatement has been defended on the ground that it
at least produces cerfainty in a field where certainty is a goal in itself. Un-
fortunately, the Restatement rule fails to produce certainty in this case.
Under Beale's theory it logically follows from the place-of-making rule that
priority of successive assignees is determined by the law of the place of the
first assignment. If such is the law, then a prospective assignee of accounts
receivable could never be sure whether or not he had perfected his assignment
even if he should give notice, since it is entirely possible that a prior assign-
ment was made in a state which follows the American rule, and will there-
fore prevail. The difficulty is that he cannot know to what law he must look.
69. See Stenographic Report of Hearing on Assignment of Accounts Receivable,
supra note 9 at 283.
70. 150 Fed. 510 (C. C. A. 6th 1907).




From the foregoing arguments, it is obvious that the place-of-making
rule is an unsuitable solution to the assignment of accounts receivable. It is
submitted that the appropriate governing lav is that of the assignor's place
of business 72 -what is known as the "primary" jurisdiction in bankruptcy.
This is the state which has the greatest interest in the transaction. The as-
signor's place of business is in nearly all cases the place of performance, the
place of payment of the accounts. Accordingly, in addition to the practical
considerations, the place-of-business theory receives all the theoretical sup-
port of the place-of-performance school.3
The purpose of recording statutes is to protect subsequent purchasers
of the accounts and creditors against fraud. The state in which the assignor
does business will have the greatest interest in such matters, since any fraud
will be perpetrated in that state. It is in that state that the obligor will pay
his debt to the assignor under non-notification financing. The books of the
assignor upon which the accounts are recorded are kept in that state. A few
states by common law decisions prohibit the assignment of future book ac-
counts.7 4 The purpose of such a rule is to safeguard the solvency of the
assignor. The state which is here interested is again the state in which the
assignor does business and not the state in which the assignments were
made, unless by chance they happen to be the same.
Since in most cases of non-notification financing the assignor is to col-
lect the accounts, and since the account books remain at the assignor's place
of business, it might be said that the parties intended that law to apply, if
they can be said to have intended any law to apply.
Although an account receivable, being incorporeal, has no "situs," the
above argument in effect gives this chose in action a situs at the creditor's
place of business.7 5 This could be explained by the maxim, mobilia personam
.sequuntur, but quoting maxims is not an adequate, method to solve the
:problem for the business man dealing in accounts receivable.
This analysis deals with the assignment as if it were a transfer of
,property-a transfer of property being governed by the law of the situs.70
72. Story would make the law of the creditor's domicile determine the essential
validity of an assignment of a debt. STORY, CoxFLICT or LAWs § 397 (8th ed. 1883).
See WESTLAKE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW § 152 (6th ed. 1922).
73. The question is what assignee is to receive the performance, and thus the law
that governs performance should control. See STUIMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 236 (1937).
74. Taylor v. Barton-Child Co., 228 Mass. 126, 117 N. E. 43 (1917). See Cohen
and Gerbor, Mortgages of Accounts Receivable, 29 GEO. L. J. 555, 556 (1941).
75. "For a debt, though it has not in strictness any local situation, may be so
connected in different ways with a particular country as to possess something which
bears an analogy or resemblance to a situs." DIcEY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 581 (4th ed. 1927).
76. The cases have dealt with assignments both as a transfer of property, and as a
matter of contract. Compare Jackson v. Tallmadge, 246 N. Y. 133, 158 N. E. 48 (1927),
affg, 216 App. Div. 100, 214 N. Y. Supp. 528 (3d Dep't 1926) (property), with




It has been pointed out, however, that historically an assignment is not a
transfer of property, but is rather in the nature of a power of attorney with
a contract to use the power.7 7 Consequently, it has been argued that the "ex-
istence of this power should be determined wholly by the law of the place
where it is given, for the parties, acting in the jurisdiction of that law, can
acquire from their actions only such rights as that law gives." 7s
But it would seem that the answer to this question of characterization
should not be decided on the basis of presently inapplicable historical origins.
Today an assignment is more than a contractual obligation between the
parties. There is a transfer of ownership.79 The Bankruptcy .Act expressly
includes assignments in its definition of "transfer." 80 This fact would seem
to foreclose any further discussion of the subject as far as the determina-
tion of voidable preferences under the Bankruptcy Act is concerned; but,
in addition, the transaction is recognized as a transfer by all the parties-
they speak of buying and selling the accounts. Accordingly, it would seem
that the rule governing conveyances is to be preferred to the rule govern-
ing contracts. This would require a reference to the law of the situs, and as
we have already pointed out, an account receivable can have no situs. But
logically we could look to the law of the state. which ha8 so substantial
an interest in the obligation as reasonably to justify the application of its
law. 8l This is the law of the assignor's place of business.
If we were to follow such a rule, that law would govern the validity
of all assignments, and accordingly it would decide the priority of all as-
signees. That is, the priority of assignees of an account receivable should be
governed by the law of the assignor's place of business. This would be true
without any discussion of vested rights,, etc. This result would allow any
prospective assignee to look to the law of the assignor's place of business
as controlling all aspects of the case. Because in most cases the financing
company will be a local concern, this will not impose an unreasonable burden
upon it.
Also, this result would be highly advantageous, since it would make
the law of the assignor's place of business govern all aspects of the account.
82
77. See Ames, The Inalienability of Choses in Action, in 3 SELECT ESSAYS IN
ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 580 (1909), also in AMfES, LECTURES ON LEGAL
HISTORY 210 (1910) ; Barbour, The History of Contract in Early English Equity, in 4
OXFORD STUDIES IN SOCIAL AND LEGAL HISTORY 108 (1909) ; Holdsworth, The History
of the Treatment of Choses in Action by the Common Law, 33 HARV. L. REv. 997,
1016 (1920).
78. Note, 20 HARV. L. REv. 637 (1907).
79. 2 WILLISTOw, COxTRAcrs § 404 (Rev. ed. 1936). See Superior Brassiere Co. v.
Zimetbaum, 214 App. Div. 525, 212 N. Y. Supp. 473 (lst Dep't 1926) ; Notes, 39 HARV.
L. REV. 649 (1926), 40 HARv. L. REV. 989, 991 (1927).
80. 52 STAT. 842 (1938), 11 U. S. C. A. § 1(30) (Supp" 1947).
81. See Freund, Chief Justice Stone and the Conflict of Laws, 59 HARV. L. REV. 1210,
1214 et seq. (1946) ; Note, 40 HARv. L. REV. 989 (1927).
82. This result has the support of the English authorities. See DICEY, CONFLICT OF
LAWS, Rule 153 (4th ed. 1927) ; In re Queensland Mercantile Agency Co. [18921, 1 Ch.
1949 ]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
That is, different laws would not control different parts of the transaction.
This approach would be similar to that employed by the English court in the
well-known case of Kelly v. Selwyn, 83 where the court "anchored" the transac-
tion at the situs of the trust corpus.
If this rule were then to be used in applying the hypothetical test of
section 60(a), it would likewise produce the most desirable result. It would
make the question of the voidability of the assignment depend on the local
law of the bankrupt. This result is desirable because geographically the
creditors of the bankrupt will be grouped around him. Most of them will
be doing business in the same state as the bankrupt. That state is the one most
interested in settling the affairs of the bankrupt, and therefore it is difficult
to see why any other law, should apply. Incidentally the application of this
law should function more efficiently since it is the law of the state in which
the bankruptcy court sits, and the one with which the court is best ac-
quainted. Any certain law that can be relied on will satisfy the wishes of
the financing concerns, since they are seeking merely a certain law upon
which they predict their interest rates.
8 4
So far no federal court has purported to apply the place-of-business rule,
although a similar result was reached in the two opinions of Referee Schenck
where the law of the place of performance was applied. This result was note-
worthy in In re Nizolek Furniture & Carpet Comipany,8 5 because there the
place of making was a state otherwise foreign to the transaction.
219 (C. A.), supra note 58. Also see Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Adams,
155 Wis. 335, 144 N. W. 1108, 52 L. R. A. (N. S.) 275 (1914). But cf. Vanbuskirk v.
Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 14 Conn. 582 (1842), supra note 48.
83. [1905] 2 Ch. 117. Selwyn, a New York domiciliary assigned to his wife his
interest in a trust fund administered in England. Under New York law notice was not
necessary. Returning to England, Selwyn assigned this same interest to the plaintiff.
The plaintiff immediately gave notice to the trustee, as was required to perfect the
assignment under English law.
Warrington, J., in deciding the case, distinguished In re Queensland Mercantile and
Agency Company, and concluded: "The ground on which I decide it is that, the fund
here being an English trust fund and this being the Court which the testator may have
contemplated as the Court which would have administered that trust fund, the order
in which the parties are to be held entitled to the trust fund must be regulated by the
law of the Court which is administering that fund." Id. at 122.
On the basis of Kelly v. Selwyn, Dr. Cheshire argued that the "question of priorities
must be determined solely by reference to the proper law of the transaction in which the
debt orginated." CHESHIRE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 455 (2d ed. 1937). This view
is also favored by Wolff, and some of the continental writers, although there seems to
be little or no support for it in this country. WOLFF, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
548, 549 (1945).
84. "The business community cries for certainty and workable principles to permit
the free extension of business credit on the security of accounts receivable." Brief of
Amici Curiae, Alan v. Lowenstein and Milton P. Kupfer, p. 2, In re Rosen, 157 F. 2d
997 (C. C. A. 3d 1946). Also see remarks of Prof. Llewellyn in Stenographic Report
of Hearing on Assignment of Accounts Receivable, supra note 9 at 291.




The confusion which followed the Klauder case considerably discouraged
non-notification financing. That the conflicts problem was not the least cause
of this confusion is obvious. In order to protect themselves, finance com-
panies sometimes found it necessary to refuse otherwise safe loans. One
practising lawyer advised banking institutions as follows:
"... we believe that persons interested in accounts receivable financing have little
choice but to operate under two relatively simple rules; at least until the law is more
definitely established than it is at the present time. The first one is that if both the
lender and the borrower are domiciled in one jurisdiction, e.g. Massachusetts, the parties
must act on the assumption that Massachusetts law will control. The second suggested
rule is that if the domicile of the lender is in one state and the domicile of the borrower
is in another, the lender should so conduct himself that the assignment of the account
receivable transfers a good lien to the lender under the law of both the state where the
lender is domiciled and the law of the state where the borrower is domiciled.
"It is entirely possible that under certain combinations of fact or if a case arises in
a particular way such two operating rules will not give complete protection. We hazard
the opinion, however, that persons interested in accounts receivable financing will not
find it feasible to operate under any more 'comprehensive set of rules with respect to
the Conflicts of Law phases of the subject and consequently that the situation is
practically one of accepting such general rules or not engaging in the business at all." 80
The restrictions and doubts of these rules were not satisfactory, and
attempts were made to rectify the situation. A definite holding of the Su-
preme Court, of course, would solve the problem as far as the Bankruptcy
Act would be concerned; however, to date there has been no such decision.
Unfortunately even such a decision could not solve the other conflicts
problems relating to the assignment of accounts.
Because of the unsatisfactory results of Section 60(a), there have been
recommendations that it be amended.
8 7 It is doubtful if such an amendment
could dissolve entirely the confusion, and, at any rate, an amendment does
not sdem to be forthcoming in the near future.
A uniform state statute has been one suggestion put forth as 'a means
of solving the problem of what is the applicable state law. There have been
serious doubts, however, as to the wisdom of such a law. Also, granting such
a law would be a wise move, there has been much debate over whether the
uniform act should be of the recording or validating type.
88 Many states
86. Malcolm, Supplemental Opinion on Conflict of Laws, 30 MASS. L. Q. 38, 41, 42
(Oct. 1945).
87. See King, Proposed Amendments to the Chandler Act, 45 Coa. L. J. 36 (1940);
McLaughlin, Defining a Preference in Bankruptcy, 60 HARV. L. REV. 233, 252 et seq.
(1946). But see Oglebay, Proposed Revision of Secti6n 60a of the Bankruptcy 'Act:
A Step Backward, 21 J. N. A. REF. BANKR. 54 (1947) Moore and Tone, Proposed Bank-
ruptcy Amendnents: Improvement or Retrogression, 57 YALE L. J. 683 (1948).
88. See HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CoMIssIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS 169 et seq. (1944); Douglas, Assigned Accounts as
Affected by Section 60a of the Bankruptcy Act and the Provisions of State Law with
Reference Thereto, 19 J. N. A. REF. BANKR. 11 (1944).
1949 ]
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have attempted piecemeal statutory solutions,8 9 but, of course, this does
not solve the conflicts problem.
A more ambitious suggestion has been made by Koessler. He advocates
the establishment by federal legislation of a uniform conflict-of-laws rule to
cover the assignment of accounts receivable. Such an act, he believes, would
be within Congressional power under the commerce clause of the Constitu-
tion.90
Whether these difficulties are settled finally by judicial decision or by
federal legislation, it is submitted that the law which controls all the aspects of
the assignment of an account receivable should be the law of the place of the
assignor's business.
89. See Koessler articles, supra note 3.
90. See Koessler, Ncw Legislation Affecting Non-Notification Financing of
.4ccounts Receivable, 44 MIcH. L. REir. 563, 614 (1946).
